

[REDACTED] #32-72 TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA . 1 OF 1
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TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 31 JULY - 6 AUGUST 1972

<u>Moscow (2669 items)</u>	<u>Peking (1315 items)</u>
Vietnam (12%)	13% Domestic Issues (29%) 36%
[U.S. Air Strikes (5%)	4% [PLA 45th (3%) 23%]
[Conference of (4%)	3% Anniversary
European Communist & Workers Parties	Indochina (19%) 17%
Crimea Meeting of Soviet Bloc Party Leaders (--)	[Sihanouk Tour (8%) 5%]
China (2%)	[PEOPLE'S DAILY (--) 3%]
Middle East (2%)	Editorial on Vietnam
Podgorny Meeting With Egyptian Parliamentary Delegation (--)	[U.S. Air Strikes (5%) 2%]
	Korean Issue in UN (1%) 7%
	UN Committee Discussions (4%) 3%
	on Seabeds

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

In its running propaganda barrage against the U.S. air strikes in the North, Hanoi insists that the dike system has continued to be bombed despite assertions by the President and other Administration spokesmen that such targets are not being hit deliberately and that any possible damage is inadvertent. On the 8th a DRV Foreign Ministry statement charged that two days after the President said it is not U.S. policy to attack civilian installations, U.S. planes "bombed and destroyed a large populated area in the center of Haiphong" as well as important sluices and dikes. The anniversary of the August 1964 Tonkin Gulf incident is used as a peg to reiterate the line that President Nixon's resumption of the air strikes will be no more successful than President Johnson's four-year air war in intimidating the Vietnamese.

Authoritative Hanoi comment on the war in the South came in a 4 August article by the military commentator "Chien Binh" (Combatant) which contended that Vietnamization has been defeated and that the allies are "on the verge of complete defeat." Attention to current fighting centers on the battles in Quang Tri Province, and there are further official protests over "criminal" allied bombardments there.

Peking, in a 4 August PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, atypically lauded the communist offensive in South Vietnam and called on the United States to "seriously negotiate" on the basis of the "fair and reasonable" PRG seven-point proposal. The editorial expressed pro forma support for PRG and DRV foreign ministry statements condemning the "crimes of U.S. imperialism." However, consistent with Peking's circumspect treatment of the President, it did not criticize the Nixon Administration by name.

High-level Moscow support for the Vietnamese struggle was offered in a 5 August PRAVDA editorial article pegged to the recent Paris meeting of European communist and workers parties. The article said cryptically that Soviet aid had recently been increased, although no new supplementary aid agreement had been publicized. While for the most part treating the United States carefully and referring to "Washington" rather than the Nixon Administration, the article did quote Brezhnev's condemnation of the "U.S. steps to blockade DRV ports" in his 27 June speech during Castro's visit.

DRV REBUTS PRESIDENT ON BOMBING OF DIKES, CIVILIAN TARGETS

While President Nixon's 27 July press conference initially prompted neither the usual NHAN DAN Commentator article nor any official

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statement, his remarks were assailed in an 8 August DRV Foreign Ministry statement on U.S. air strikes. The statement began with a detailed accounting of alleged strikes against cities and such other civilian targets as schools, hospitals, churches, dikes, and water conservancy projects. Without referring to the press conference explicitly, it observed that "recently" the President had said it is U.S. policy not to bomb civilian installations and to avoid inflicting losses on the civilian population, but that this was contradicted in eyewitness accounts by foreigners, including Americans, of the bombing of cities and dikes. The statement seemed to allude to the content of the State Department report on the status of the DRV dikes, released the day after the President's press conference, when it said: "U.S. bombs and shells have not only destroyed 12 dike sections, as the U.S. authorities admitted, but 58 dike sections. The Americans have struck not only at the upper reaches but also at the lower reaches of the rivers."

The DRV Foreign Ministry documented its claim that "the statements of the U.S. authorities are hypocritical and completely perfidious" by detailing strikes "two days after President Nixon said that it is not U.S. policy to attack civilian installations." The foreign ministry claimed that a large populated area in the center of Haiphong had been destroyed along with the complete destruction of "the Lan sluice--a salt-water control and drainage project for tens of thousands of hectares of rice paddies in the four districts south of Thai Binh Province, where hundreds of thousands of people live." It added that U.S. planes had also struck at a section of the Chu River dike and at the Ngoc Quang sluice in Thanh Hoa Province.

The statement reiterated in standard fashion the determination of the Vietnamese not to be intimidated by "bombs, threats, or crafty political and diplomatic schemes and tricks." It also thanked the communist and other countries for their condemnations of U.S. actions and called on "brothers and friends" to struggle "even more vigorously to stay the hands of the U.S. imperialist aggressors."

**WATER CONSERVANCY
MINISTER'S INTERVIEW**

Following up on statements made last week by water conservation officials,* NHAN DAN on 7 August published an interview with Water Conservancy Minister Ha Ke Tan which, unlike the earlier statements, explicitly attacked President Nixon's remarks at his

* See the TRENDS of 2 August 1972, page 4.

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27 July press conference. Tan cited the President's press conference remarks as only the latest in a series of attempted denials of U.S. actions. In this connection he quoted the President as saying in Texas on 30 April that "dikes are a strategic target and indirectly a military target," but he neglected to add that the President had explained that it was not U.S. policy to bomb the dikes. Tan cited alleged strikes at numerous dike portions since the 27th, "immediately after Nixon claimed that he had ordered the pilots not to strike the dikes." The "Nixon clique," he said, had claimed that whatever damage has been caused is minor and easily repaired and that no vital dike portions have been destroyed. Maintaining that any damage to a dike must be considered major, Tan also emphasized the deliberate nature of the alleged U.S. attacks: Any such attacks, he claimed, "must be calculated as to the timing, method, or place," while the types of bombs reportedly dropped "are intended to destroy the dike and to kill dike-menders."

Referring explicitly to the State Department report, Tan cited it as proof that the United States "has made an elaborate study of the land and the river systems in North Vietnam before picking its targets" and claimed that "points of crucial importance," such as the convergence of six rivers in the Nam Sach district, have indeed been hit. Though continuing to stress that most of the installations reported hit have been major ones ("all the 58 dike portions that were bombed by American aircraft," he said, "are the most vital portions"), he also made it clear that bombing of secondary dikes would be just as serious, since they are all connected together in one large system.

Tan refuted U.S. assertions that neither the 1971 flood damage nor more recent damage from bombing was fully repaired, but he said that continued U.S. bombing made it difficult to insure the quality of such repairs. He also rebutted U.S. contentions that such repairs could be accomplished in a few days by stressing that repairs made to counter 1971 flood damage have required "a very big amount of earth," "tens of thousands of workdays," and "digging machines that worked almost around the clock."

Allusions to the State Department report have appeared in other Hanoi propaganda, including an article in the 6 August edition of the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN entitled "Roundabout Denials Cannot Hide Crimes." According to Hanoi radio's review of the paper, the article said that the fact that the "Nixon clique" publicized the report "at a time when the rainy and flash flood season is coming reminds us that we must be extremely vigilant. The war criminals

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in the White House and Pentagon are "trying to justify their crimes so they can continue their wicked schemes of attacking our dikes." The article concluded that although the dike system "is strong this year," continued vigilance is necessary in the face of "the Nixon clique's reckless war escalation acts" and "ever more violent bombing."

In a 4 August article detailing the alleged strikes of 29 and 30 July on the Lan sluice and other dike sections in Thai Binh, Thanh Hoa, and Ha Bac provinces, Hanoi radio scorned the U.S. position that any such bombings are accidental and claimed that they only "make people more indignant at the dirty trick of making public so-called intelligence documents with pictures on 28 July."

ATTACKS AT
PARIS TALKS

Despite the continued denunciations in other propaganda, the VNA account of the Paris session on 3 August glossed over much of the diatribe directed there at U.S. policy and the President. Thus, it failed to report PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Binh's charge that the United States was bombing dams and dikes in the North to provoke floods as well as her assertion that the Americans' alleged waging of a genocidal and ecocidal war of extermination in Vietnam "refutes" the President's arguments at his 27 July press conference regarding casualties in South Vietnam. VNA did note that Xuan Thuy "produced undeniable evidence of the Nixon Administration's intentional bombing of the dike system and dams in North Vietnam" and that he refuted the President's "distortions" at his press conference. But it omitted the details of the documentation along with Xuan Thuy's remark that "faced with irrefutable evidence and with the strong opposition of public opinion, the President was forced to admit at his press conference that the Americans have bombed the dams and dikes in North Vietnam, but he alleged that these bombings were 'accidental. . .'"

The account as usual glossed over the allied delegates' statements, saying only that "the U.S. delegate repeated the so-called 8 May proposal while pleading for the U.S. attacks on North Vietnam's dikes and dams and finding pretexts for continuing such criminal acts." VNA thus ignored the fact that Ambassador Porter in preliminary remarks objected to the communist delegates' "invective" against the President. Hanoi media, as usual, have not reported exchanges with reporters at the post-session briefings regarding the atmosphere of the meeting.

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COMMENT ON A NHAN DAN editorial of 9 August, the day
HAIPHONG, DIKES after the foreign ministry statement, called
Haiphong "the most vivid showplace of Nixon's
extremely barbarous war of destruction against our heavily
populated cities" and claimed that not even Coventry suffered
such heavy bombing "based on the number of bombs per acre."
Hailing the city's workers for their industry and vigor under
wartime conditions, it boasted that they continually man
antiaircraft positions, volunteer for combat duty after each new
U.S. "crime" and, for the past three months, "have bravely
engaged in a contest of wits with the enemy and have unloaded
and transported an important quantity of goods."

Comment throughout the week had stressed the destruction of large
areas of the city at the end of July. A radio commentary on
2 August linked the raids on Haiphong to those on the dikes in
calling them new war escalation steps "which far exceed--in degree
of cruelty and the gravity of crimes--the escalation of the war
of destruction between 1965 and 1968." It likened these "crimes"
to those of the "fascist Hitler clique" and repeated standard
assertions that such acts would only strengthen the resolve of the
Vietnamese people and draw greater indignation from abroad. It
specifically charged the United States with using "more than
100 demolition and gas bombs" in its raids of 31 July on two wards
inhabited mainly by Chinese. (According to U.S. sources, a
dockyard area in Haiphong was bombed that day.)

The General Association of Chinese Residents in Vietnam issued its
own statement on the bombings of Haiphong, as reported by VNA and
Hanoi radio in Mandarin. It reminded the Chinese residents in
Vietnam that their destiny is linked with that of the Vietnamese,
and it urged them to unite in responding to President Thang's
14 July appeal and the DRV Foreign Ministry's 31 July statement
which condemned the raids on Haiphong.

Hanoi has repeatedly recapitulated charges of U.S. strikes against
dikes since early April, without giving precise dates. The target
most frequently cited is the Lan sluice in Thai Binh Province,
reportedly destroyed on 29 July. The Foreign Ministry statement
of the 8th, which singled out the attack on the Lan sluice,
charged that there have been 177 bombings and shellings of dikes
and water conservancy projects in 15 provinces, with damage to
or destruction of "thousands of meters of crucial dike sections,"
"many dams," and so forth.

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Specific attacks on the dike system were mentioned in the Foreign Ministry spokesman's statements of 3 and 4 August and in a Hanoi radio report of bombing near the capital of Hai Hung Province. Targets reported hit were a portion of the sea dike in Diem Dien, Thai Thuy district, Thai Binh Province and the Nam Dan dam in Nghe An, on either the 2d or 3d; the Cam Ly sluice in Quang Binh Province, on 3 August; and many sections of dike around Hai Duong in Hai Hung on 8 August. The spokesman's statement of the 4th also charged U.S. planes with bombing villagers carrying out irrigation tasks in Nghi Xuan district of Ha Tinh Province. Other recent alleged strikes include those at the dike along the south bank of the Ma River in the Nam Ngan area of Thanh Hoa Province on 1 August, with succeeding strikes on the 3d; at the concrete portion of the dike along the Dap Cau River in Ha Bac Province on 30 July and 1 August; at a section of dike along the Hong River in Vu Thu district of Thai Binh Province on 31 July; and at the Chu River dike and the Ngoc Quang sluice, both in Thanh Hoa Province, on 29 July.

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FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN CONTINUES ROUTINE PROTESTS

The DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman has continued the routine condemnation of the "criminal acts of war escalation" of the Nixon Administration.

- + The statement of 3 August, protesting bombing actions of the preceding day, highlighted the alleged destruction of two hydraulic projects: a portion of the sea dike in Diem Dien, Thai Thuy district, Thai Binh Province, and the Nam Dan dam in Nghe An. It emphasized that this "brazen and deceitful trick" occurred at a time when the Nixon Administration was explaining that "the United States has no intention of bombing and shelling dikes and dams and the irrigation system and that it is making every possible effort to avoid the recurrence of such events." Less specific charges included the bombing and strafing of populated areas in Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh area, and bombing by B-52's of a number of localities in the Vinh Linh area.
- + The dike issue again surfaced in the spokesman's statement of the 4th, which charged U.S. aircraft with striking the Cam Ly sluice in Quang Binh Province and bombing "people who were carrying out irrigation tasks" in a village in Nghe Xuan district of Ha Tinh Province. Civilian casualties and property damage were also listed as a result of alleged strikes at populated areas in Quang Binh, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Ninh provinces and the Vinh Linh area.
- + The statement of the 5th denounced alleged U.S. air raids of that day on districts in and surrounding Hanoi, as well as raids of the 4th on populated areas in Thai Binh, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces. It further charged U.S. warships and B-52's with attacking several localities in Quang Binh Province. Claiming that such "barbarous" acts "have laid bare the perfidy of the U.S. allegations that it does not bomb civilian targets in North Vietnam" and have "insolently challenged public opinion in the world and in the United States," the statement alleged that the U.S. "war maniacs" will not succeed in their aim of forcing the Vietnamese people to lay down their arms, but will succeed only in increasing their determination to fight and win.

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+ Continuing "U.S. acts of war escalation" of 5 and 6 August were condemned in the spokesman's statement of the 7th, which further claimed that these acts were "duly punished" by the downing of eight U.S. planes and the capture of their pilots on the same days. Specific charges included, on the 5th, the previously mentioned attacks on Hanoi, reported bombing and strafing of populated areas in Ha Tay, Ha Bac, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces, and strikes by B-52's and warships on localities in Quang Binh; on the 6th, bombing and rocketing of the outskirts of both Hanoi and Haiphong, as well as air strikes on populated areas in Lang Son, Ha Tay, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and attacks by warships on villages on the coast of Nam Ha and Ha Tinh.

+ In the statement of the 9th, the spokesman termed "particularly grave" the heavy bombing of the Hai Hung provincial capital and its outskirts on the 8th. In addition to many civilian casualties and extensive property damage, the statement claimed damage to many dike sections within and outside the city. Other air strikes of 7 and 8 August were reported on Haiphong, Hai Hung, Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone. In a passage omitted from the VNA version, the statement also charged B-52's with bombing many localities in Quang Binh and the Vinh Linh zone, and warships with shelling the Lan sluice area in Thai Binh Province and coastal hamlets in Ha Tinh. The VNA version (but not the domestic service) then proceeded to reiterate the DRV's position that the U.S. strikes constitute deliberate attacks on populated areas, dikes and dams. As usual, the statement ended with a demand that all such acts cease.

PLANE DOWNINGS, CAPTURED PILOTS Capture of an unspecified number of pilots was reported on 6 August; the spokesman's statement of the 7th claimed the downing of eight planes and the capture of their pilots on the 5th and 6th. The total number of claimed plane downings over the DRV reached 3,806 this week, with the reported downing of one over Quang Ninh, three over Nghe An, one over Thanh Hoa, four over Hanoi, and three over Haiphong--the latter figure including the 3,800th plane, reported downed on 6 August.

The downing of the 3,800th plane received standard acclaim: a message from the VPA High Command on the 6th, a Hanoi radio commentary of the same date, and a NHAN DAN editorial and

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QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on the 7th. All categories of the air defense system were praised, particularly the "low-altitude firenet" of the militia and its effective coordination with other branches of the armed forces. The NHAN DAN editorial particularly hailed the armed forces and people of Haiphong for standing on the frontline of "the fight against the war of destruction and the blockade waged by Nixon." The editorial claimed that "the U.S. war maniacs have obviously failed in their attempt to paralyze the economy and sever the communications and transportation operations in the DRV which would have made it difficult for our southern armed forces' and people's struggle."

Statistics cited in reportage on the eighth anniversary of the Tonkin Gulf incident (5 August) claimed that the total number of planes downed since the escalation of the air war in early April was now 351, of which nine were said to be B-52's; eight of these were said to have been downed by the missile force.

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INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES INVESTIGATION TEAM TOURS DRV

The current visit to the DRV of an investigation team of the International Commission for Inquiring Into U.S. War Crimes in Indochina, including former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark, is exploited by Hanoi in comment focused on alleged U.S. air strikes at the dikes, including the Lan sluice, and in the Haiphong area. Both Hanoi radio and VNA reported several fairly lengthy statements by Clark, as well as shorter ones by other members of the team, after visits to bombed areas in Hanoi, Haiphong, and various outlying provinces between 2 and 6 August.

While statements attributed to other members of the delegation tended to emphasize the legal nature of their investigative task, the statements attributed to Clark centered on the extent of damage done and the amount of human suffering involved, either directly or, as in the case of the dikes, potentially. In comments after visiting the Lan sluice, for example, he referred to recent flooding in the United States. According to the reports of his discussion of attacks on both Haiphong and a village in Thai Binh, Clark reserved judgment as to whether such strikes were justified in military terms or were accidental. In the latter case, in particular, he suggested that the U.S. Air Force reveal the intended target in the Thai Binh area which resulted in the destruction of a secondary school and hospital on 31 July. In both cases, however, VNA reported him as adding that whether the bombings were a mistake or not, they should never have been carried out in the first place, since the United States is not legally at war with the DRV.

There was one notable discrepancy between the Hanoi radio and VNA English versions of Clark's comments on his 5 August visit to Haiphong. The radio version, broadcast on the 6th, quoted Clark as saying that "many buildings were totally destroyed. We could be fortunate, I guess, that more people weren't killed. It's quite amazing that, when you look at the dimension of the destruction here--all this area--that many people weren't killed . . . it could have been hundreds or even thousands." The VNA account of 8 August gave an entirely different meaning to this statement when it quoted him as saying: "We can see that many buildings were totally destroyed. I guess that more people were killed. It's quite amazing when you look at the dimension of the destruction here of all this area. There are many, many people killed . . . anyway it could be hundreds or even thousands."

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In comments on his 3 August visit to a dike in Thai Binh, Clark was quoted as saying that the large crater and other damage resulting from a direct hit by a U.S. bomb were already being repaired by "many, many people" and as stressing that "the people of Vietnam are very hard workers." In a statement concerning what was probably the same site, Danish parliamentarian Froede Jakobsen was reported to have said it was evident that the dike had been deliberately hit, since the bombing was restricted to the immediate area and there were no military targets or communications lines nearby. Jakobsen was quoted as concluding that this bombing, as well as that of various cities and villages, constituted wanton destruction without military reason.

EDUCATION MINISTRY,
LAWYERS' STATEMENTS

According to VNA, on the afternoon of 9 July Hans Goran Franck, head of the investigation team, was officially informed by DRV Vice Minister of Education Vo Thuan Nho of U.S. "crimes" against educational establishments in the DRV. Citing specific instances, the vice minister alleged that between mid-April and mid-July the United States had bombed 60 general schools in 12 provinces, totally destroying 800 classrooms and a large quantity of teaching equipment. Nho stressed that the bombing of at least several of these establishments was premeditated, since they were far from any military targets or communications lines. Franck and three other members of the investigation team reportedly promised to relate this information to international teachers' organizations and UNESCO and to try to collect more evidence of "U.S. crimes" in order to denounce them to world opinion, especially at the forthcoming third conference of the war crimes commission in Cuba.

The question of the legality of alleged U.S. actions in the DRV was also taken up in the first part of a recorded discussion of the bombing of the dikes and dams by two "specialists in international and criminal law and authors of many studies and articles on U.S. war crimes," broadcast by Hanoi radio's domestic service on 8 August. The two lawyers--identified as Do Xuan Sang and Pham Van Tinh--labeled U.S. actions "crimes" as defined by the Nuremberg tribunal and Bertrand Russell's "international court" and noted that the investigation team now in North Vietnam is composed of "well-known jurists." They rejected "lawyer Nixon's" assertion at his 27 July press conference that there has been no flooding, noting the danger point has not yet been reached; and they rebutted his statement that no major dike sections have been hit,

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charging that dikes in Hanoi, Thai Binh, and Thanh Hoa have been bombed. Ridiculing the President's statement that the United States could destroy the dike system within a week, Sang reportedly said that "his plea is not that of a serious, genuine lawyer and his threat is useless." Vinh portrayed the President's statements as the attempt of a tricky lawyer to justify or deny his "crimes" before international law and the "new international tribunal [of] mankind's conscience."

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PRG, DRV SCORE ALLIED "CRIMES," DENY KILLINGS IN BINH DINH

QUANG TRI Allied bombing and shelling in Quang Tri Province prompted new statements from the PRG Foreign Ministry on 3 and 4 August. The one on the 3d discussed alleged "crimes" in July in North and South Vietnam, highlighting the action in Quang Tri. And the one on the 4th focused on destruction in the Quang Tri provincial capital. U.S. air and artillery support for the GVN counteroffensive in Quang Tri had been previously protested in PRG Foreign Ministry statements on 11, 18, and 30 July.* Like the earlier statements, the current ones called upon other governments and people to take action to "stay in time the bloody hands of the Nixon Administration." But the statement on the 4th did not repeat the warning, in the protest on the 3d as well as the earlier ones, that "the Vietnamese people and the PRGRSV assume for themselves the right to take all necessary measures to retaliate against the U.S. aggressors with appropriate punishing blows."

The 4 August foreign ministry statement repeated charges in previous statements denouncing intensive bombardments of Quang Tri city in July. And it went on to accuse the United States of launching further attacks, during four consecutive days ending 3 August, with hundreds of tactical planes and B-52's and dozens of warships attempting to "destroy the provincial capital and its citadel." It alleged that during this four-day period U.S. aircraft dropped over 10,000 tons of bombs and ground and naval artillery fired some 50,000 shells at the city. It also claimed that on 2 and 3 August the allies fired "hundreds of cannon shells containing toxic chemicals" at the citadel.

A 7 August statement by the Quang Tri People's Revolutionary Committee reviewed alleged allied bombing and shelling in Quang Tri since 27 June--the day before the start of Saigon's counteroffensive in the province. It charged that during the past month the allies have "killed or wounded thousands of civilians and caused the poisoning of thousands of others, of whom many old persons and children died." It accused the Nixon Administration of "an extremely serious act of war" in concentrating planes and ships for "exterminating attacks on the liberated province of Quang Tri and unleashing a quantity of bombs and shells

* For a discussion of previous statements, see the TRENDS of 12 July 1972, pages 11-12; 19 July, pages 16-17; and 2 August, page 13.

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never before seen in any war of aggression against any area of less than three square kilometers and a citadel covering hardly one-third of a square kilometer." It charged that allied actions in Quang Tri are worse than the massacre at My Lai, which aroused "strong" public protest and condemnation, and that "this monstrous crime has surpassed by far that committed by the fascist Hitler." Deriding Administration "clamors" that only communist bases and positions are attacked, that toxic chemicals harmful to humans are not used, and that the allies bombed and shelled "with surgical precision," the statement asserted that "realities on the battlefield of Quang Tri have fully exposed the U.S. imperialists' crimes against our people." Praising the resistance of the armed forces and people of Quang Tri, the statement claimed that in the past month they had put out of action over 10,000 allied troops, downed nearly 100 U.S. aircraft, and destroyed nearly 100 military vehicles, including many tanks and armored cars.

An 8 August NHAN DAN editorial endorsed the protests in the 3 and 4 August PRG Foreign Ministry statements and the Quang Tri committee's statement. It dwelt upon the attacks on Quang Tri city, claiming that 350,000 tons of bombs had been dropped on the city and its surroundings in addition to tens of thousands of artillery shells. It also said specifically that toxic chemicals had been used 40 times in this area. Echoing other propaganda in calling for action to "stay in time the Nixon clique's criminal hands," the editorial added the unique assertion that "the general moral principle is: the war criminals must be punished."

BINH DINH The 3 August PRG Foreign Ministry statement, while concentrating its charges on alleged actions in Quang Tri, also cited specific U.S. raids in Binh Dinh Province--the site of another ARVN counteroffensive beginning on 19 July. The statement accused the United States of bombing three dams on the Lai Giang River on 20 July "in an attempt to strike directly at the life of the people" in Hoai An and Hoai Nhon districts which were "recently liberated."

Reports of communist executions of Saigon government officials in Binh Dinh Province, released by allied officials on 3 August, were denounced as "lies and slanders" in a statement by the spokesman for the PRG delegation in Paris on 5 August, carried by LPA on the 8th. The statement accused the United States of using these "fabrications" in an attempt to divert public opinion from

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allied "crimes" and to justify continuation of the war, support for Thieu, and refusal to enter into serious negotiations. On the 9th an article in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN scored the "utterly odious slanders" about communist atrocities and mass murders and cited Western reports of civilian casualties caused by allied attacks. The reports, according to the article, are "a slap to the liars whose fabrications are made with the sole purpose of misleading the public and covering their crimes against the Vietnamese people."

"CHIEN BINH" SAYS OFFENSIVE SHOWS FAILURE OF VIETNAMIZATION

The communist offensive was analyzed in an article by the North Vietnamese military commentator "Chien Binh" (Combatant), broadcast by Hanoi radio and published in both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 4 August. The article, entitled "The Failure of Vietnamization is Obvious," contended that Vietnamization "has been defeated" and that the allies are now "on the verge of complete defeat." Chien Binh's last article, published in the 9 April issue of QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, had hailed the communists' initial achievements in their offensive and declared that it was "an important test" of Vietnamization.*

While most of the Chien Binh article discussed the military situation, it included a reference to the President's 8 May speech which went beyond Hanoi's standard rejection of the cease-fire proposal as an attempt to make the "liberation" forces lay down their arms. Chien Binh argued that the President's speech reflected the "defeatist mood" of the White House as well as the "reactionary nature" of U.S. "imperialists." And as documentation he cited the President's simultaneous advocacy of bombing and mining and the call for a cease-fire. The editorial and an article in the June HOC TAP had also viewed the cease-fire proposal as a sign of weakness. They charged that it was a "trick" to check the offensive and gain time to organize a counterattack.

* The 9 April Chien Binh article is discussed in the 19 April 1972 TRENDS, pages 27-28. His last previous article--published in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 2 April 1971 and discussed in the 7 April 1971 TRENDS, pages 1-3--contained one of the earliest arguments in Hanoi media for the launching of large-scale attacks in South Vietnam.

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Just as Chien Binh's April article had ridiculed the allies for failing to anticipate the timing and focus of the communists' offensive, the current article derided the allies for alleged miscalculations. Chien Binh asserted, for example, that they had expected only short-term attacks in the highlands and had not foreseen the communist use of tanks and heavy artillery to attack in three different "strategic areas." He also derisively recalled that according to a 29 April AP report Presidential adviser Kissinger had said that the offensive would "run its course by 1 July" but that, on the contrary, the offensive "is developing strongly and steadily." Chien Binh suggested that the offensive might continue for some time when he stressed the significance of the "favorable" trend of the balance of forces and said that the southern army and people "are struggling to gain time to gradually annihilate or weaken the enemy forces, smash the pacification plan, develop their forces, and organize firm battlegrounds so as to change the war situation and win increasingly greater victories." Predicting "more decisive trials," Chien Binh concluded that "never before has our struggle had a more meaningful character than it does now." He also stressed the importance of great individual efforts in the current period.

The suggestion that the struggle will be protracted has been a recurrent theme in Hanoi propaganda on the offensive. As early as 20 April a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial qualified praise for initial victories in the offensive with the admonitions that the "law of the resistance" indicates that offensives advance "protractededly" and "many difficulties and challenges lie ahead." Similarly, a 3 May article by the military commentator "Chien Thang" (Victor) contended that the communists can both fight "protractededly" and on a large scale, points the author had made in a December 1971 article.*

Chien Binh derided U.S. hopes that the communists would be weakened and would change their attitude in the face of the bombing and mining of DRV ports, and he suggested that miscalculations on this score had led to the recent GVN counteroffensives. The Saigon assaults, he maintained, were launched because President Nixon was under an "illusion" that "the puppet army seemed to succeed in

* The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial is discussed in the 26 April 1972 TRENDS, page 2, and Chien Thang's article was analyzed in the 3 May 1972 TRENDS, pages 4-6. More recent references to the need to fight protractededly are noted in the 6 July 1972 TRENDS, page 12.

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raising its head and the adversary's offensive seemed to be coming to an end." He argued that the counteroffensives have not changed the balance of forces and that the allies did not surprise their adversary but were "unexpectedly trapped." Describing the Quang Tri counteroffensive as an effort to break the "encirclement" around Hue, Chien Binh claimed that "by so doing the U.S.-puppets committed another mistake by marching into a trap laid by the adversary." The suggestion that the allies entered a "trap" in Quang Tri also has appeared in other propaganda.

Stressing the impact of the offensive on the ARVN, Chien Binh claimed, among other things, that the Saigon army had more than 700,000 troops before the offensive but now, despite conscription and upgrading efforts, its total strength has dropped to about 600,000. By contrast, according to Chien Binh, the PLAF has increased in size and the communists have never before had "a main force as strong and numerous as it is now, with such improved equipment and springboards from which to launch attacks everywhere."

Chien Binh offered a standard communist analysis of the fighting at An Loc, Kontum, and Hue to refute the allied contention that the showing of Saigon troops in these provincial capitals demonstrated their capability to face main-force units. He argued that An Loc was actually "a big disaster" for Saigon since it pinned down and depicted three ARVN divisions, thus assisting liberation forces to launch attacks in the Mekong Delta. Although communist media during the peak of the fighting at An Loc mistakenly claimed that their forces had captured the city (on 15 April), by the end of May comment on the fighting had shifted attention away from the besieged provincial capital and stressed the success of forces blocking Highway 13 leading to An Loc. Like Chien Binh now, a 26 May NHAN DAN article, for example, commented that the fighting around An Loc had "attracted and decimated large enemy forces, thus creating favorable conditions for other battlefronts."* Similarly, Chien Binh's

* One atypical commentary from the South Vietnamese communist party journal TIEN PHONG, broadcast by Liberation Radio on 3 June, had appeared to criticize communist failure to take such objectives as An Loc when it urged more resolute attacks at the provincial level and added that it is not enough to annihilate manpower but "we must also liberate" areas. See the 14 June 1972 TRENDS, page 17.

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dismissal of the situation in Kontum with the observation that the communists control the entire province with the exception of the capital is consistent with propaganda on the fighting there since the first week of June when communist units were pushed out of Kontum city. In dismissing the successful ARVN defense of Hue, Chien Binh noted that it had required four divisions--a third of Saigon's main-force divisions--backed by massive support from U.S. planes and ships. He derisively added: "If the defense of a city needs such a military force, one wonders how many other places in South Vietnam the U.S.-puppets can afford to defend."

While some communist commentators have criticized local forces for failing to take advantage of the main-force offensive to press the struggle in their areas,* Chien Binh stated optimistically that "never have the two aspects of annihilating the enemy strength and regaining mastership by the southern armed forces and people been so closely coordinated as they are in this offensive." He claimed routinely that the offensive has caused setbacks for pacification and expanded the "liberated" zone and he commented that "the southern armed forces and people now possess a basis on which to further step up the guerrilla warfare and people's war in localities and to advance toward smashing the enemy's coercive machinery in the countryside."

* For discussions of such critical comment, see the TRENDS of 12 July 1972, pages 12-13; 21 June, pages 11-12; and 14 June, pages 16-17. Vietnamese communist comment on the coordination of conventional and guerrilla warfare is discussed in the 26 April TRENDS, pages 4-8.

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PEOPLE'S DAILY EDITORIAL LAUDS OFFENSIVE, PRG SEVEN POINTS

A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial of 4 August was more forthcoming than other recent Peking comment on Vietnam in two respects: it lauded the communist offensive in more detail than has appeared in any authoritative comment since early June; and it characterized the PRG seven-point proposal as "fair and reasonable" and called on the United States to negotiate on that basis. Since the announcement in late June that the Paris talks would resume on 13 July, Peking has sidestepped a flat endorsement of the Vietnamese communist position, stressing instead that such international disputes should be settled through accommodation by the parties concerned without outside interference.* The 20 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the anniversary of the 1954 Geneva agreements had singled out the call for formation of a tripartite coalition government, which it had called "completely reasonable and just," rather than offering general backing of the PRG proposal.

In assailing U.S. escalation in both the North and the South in response to the communist offensive, the editorial expressed support for PRG and DRV foreign ministry statements of 30 and 31 July. It did not mention the comprehensive 27 July DRV memorandum which denounced U.S. actions for the past four months, although on 3 August NCNA reported that the DRV charge d'affaires had distributed copies of the memorandum at a Peking press conference that day. The pattern and level of Peking's endorsements of official Vietnamese protests since April has varied, but the only previous PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial was that supporting the 16 April DRV party-government appeal following U.S. bombing of Haiphong and Hanoi.** Peking's high-level support for the

* This line was put forth most pointedly by Chou En-lai in a speech on 9 July. See the TRENDS of 12 July 1972, pages 15-17.

** Peking assailed U.S. air strikes in PRC Foreign Ministry statements on 10 April, 9 May, and 12 June, the statement in June reacting to strikes near the Chinese border. The President's announcement of the mining of DRV ports prompted an 11 May PRC Government statement. Some of the DRV protests since April have received no specific Chinese endorsement, but on two occasions PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator articles were issued, most recently on 25 July in response to alleged U.S. bombing of DRV dams and dikes.

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Vietnamese at this time may have been designed to answer persistent Vietnamese calls for international support as the new round of Paris talks moved into its fourth week with no visible sign of progress.

While stating that "fresh brilliant victories" had been achieved and congratulating the Vietnamese on the "excellent situation," the editorial stopped short of Vietnamese communist assessments of the offensive. In contrast to Hanoi and Front claims that Vietnamization is being defeated, PEOPLE'S DAILY merely hailed the "sustained and vigorous" offensive as a "telling blow" to the program and an inspiration to three Indochinese peoples. The editorial sidestepped any PRC pledge of support for the war when it noted Vietnamese determination to continue the fight and asserted that the Vietnamese are "indomitable."

The editorial typically avoided any criticism of the Nixon Administration by name, saying, for example, that "U.S. imperialism" has "wantonly bombed North Vietnam, mined and blockaded its ports, and even bombed its dams and dikes." Consistent with its discretion regarding the President, Peking has continued to delete from Vietnamese accounts some of the harsher charges directed against him. Thus, NCNA's replay of a 7 August NHAN DAN account of an interview with the DRV minister of water conservancy omitted charges that President Nixon had revealed a "well-conceived plan" to bomb the dikes as early as last April. And a pickup of an 8 August DRV Foreign Ministry statement failed to include a passage attacking the President's remarks on the dikes at his news conference of the 27th. However, Peking did report the DRV charge that recent statements by U.S. officials on the alleged bombing of the dikes were "hypocritical and sheer deception."

MOSCOW STRESSES AID TO VIETNAM IN PRAVDA EDITORIAL ARTICLE

Current Moscow comment is highlighted by a 5 August PRAVDA editorial article pegged to the Paris conference of European communist and workers' parties which was convened on 27 July to express solidarity with Vietnam. The article emphasized the constancy of Soviet assistance to the Vietnamese, and one passage suggested that a new aid agreement may recently have been reached.

Moscow issues PRAVDA editorial articles on Indochina only infrequently.* This one seems somewhat belated as a followup to

* The most recent previous one was in September 1969 on Ho's death, and the last one before that was in June 1968 assailing alleged U.S. foot-dragging at the DRV-U.S. Paris talks.

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the Paris meeting, coming more than a week after the event, and may also have been intended to stress Soviet support at a time when Peking has given editorial support to Vietnamese communist statements condemning U.S. bombing. Moscow as usual has given no official support to the continuing DRV and PRG official protests, although it has continued to denounce the bombings along established lines in routine-level comment as well as in brief statements by various Soviet public organizations which have been pegged to the Paris party meeting. The editorial article came the day after PRAVDA briefly reported that the DRV Ambassador in Moscow held a press conference the day before at which he condemned the U.S. bombing and thanked the USSR for its aid. Unlike Peking's report of a similar press conference in the PRC capital, Moscow's report did not indicate whether the ambassador publicized the 27 July DRV "memorandum" on recent U.S. escalation.

The editorial article contained no overt polemical attacks on Peking's Indochina policy, but it did picture the USSR as standing at the forefront in the movement of collective solidarity with Vietnam. It recalled that the "consultative" meeting of 19 parties in Moscow in March 1965 and the major Moscow international communist conference of June 1969 represented collective support of peoples struggling against "imperialist aggression." The current commentary may have been issued in the authoritative format of an editorial article because it was pegged to a meeting of parties. The March 1965 meeting had also prompted an editorial article. Although there was no such article at the time of the June 1969 meeting, its anniversaries in 1970 and 1972--but not in 1971--were both marked with editorial articles.

The 5 August article dramatized Soviet support by quoting passages from Brezhnev's 27 June speech during Castro's visit which represented the strongest official Soviet condemnation of U.S. Vietnam policies since the President's visit to Moscow. It cited Brezhnev's denunciation of the U.S. "blockade" of DRV ports and bombing of DRV economic targets, communications, and population centers along with his call for a withdrawal of U.S. troops and his expression of support for the proposals of the DRV, the PRG, the FUNK, and the NLHS. After citing Brezhnev's assertion that the Soviet stand on this question is "clear and immutable," the article added that the USSR's "principled stand" on support and aid for the Vietnamese people was put forth at the Soviet-U.S. summit talks in May. Consistent with Moscow's general circumspection regarding the President personally, however, the article was careful to condemn only the escalation by the "U.S. ruling circles" and said that the solidarity of the parties will isolate "Washington's aggressive circles."

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AID ISSUE The PRAVDA article repeated the claim that the Paris meeting demonstrated unified support of Vietnam by the European parties and noted that the delegates put forward "a large number of specific proposals for practical collective measures which can be taken in addition to what is already being done" to intensify solidarity with Vietnam. It pointed out that over the years the USSR and other socialist countries have been giving Vietnam political, military, and economic aid and that the Soviet Union's stand "has been and still is" one of full support for the just struggle of the Indochinese peoples.

A passage noting that the Soviet Union "has recently increased its aid to the Vietnamese peoples still further" suggested that some new Soviet-DRV aid agreement may have been reached. There has been no publicity for a new aid accord, but on 13 July Moscow radio reported that Soviet Vice Premier Novikov--the official usually concerned with Soviet-DRV aid matters--saw the DRV Ambassador to discuss "problems relating to Soviet-Vietnamese economic cooperation." A delegation of the USSR Ministry of Maritime Fleet visited the DRV from 22 to 29 July, according to VNA, but Moscow media did not report that visit. VNA said that the delegation, headed by a vice minister, came "to work with" the DRV Ministry of Transportation and Communication and Ministry of Foreign Trade but did not further elaborate on the purpose of the visit.

Moscow's last regular annual aid agreement with the DRV was signed in October 1971, and a "supplementary" aid agreement was reportedly signed on 29 December 1971. Peking, having signed its annual aid agreement in September 1971, has signed "supplementary" agreements on 22 January and 28 June 1972.

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MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW REBUTS WESTERN PRESS SPECULATION ON SOVIET-ARAB TIES

Continuing to warn of Western "psychological warfare" aimed at disrupting Arab-Soviet friendship, Moscow now guardedly acknowledges a link between such "gratuitous speculation" and the departure of Soviet military personnel from Egypt. Soviet comment also registers sensitivity to the notion that the USSR pursues its "superpower" interests to the detriment of its Arab friends. Commentators stress that it is the Soviet Union's intention to continue developing and consolidating relations with Egypt, and Moscow has publicized statements by Egyptian officials--Foreign Minister Ghalib in an OGONEK interview and visiting National Assembly speaker Badawi in an interview for Moscow radio's Arabic service--testifying to continuing friendship and expressing appreciation for Soviet support and assistance.

Moscow has again reminded the Arabs of their need for such aid: Thus TASS on the 8th pointedly cited the Syria: chief of staff as paying tribute to Soviet political, economic, and military assistance and cautioning that "one must not underestimate the importance of that assistance in the cause of consolidating the Arab countries' defensive power." At the same time, Moscow continues to charge that U.S. economic and military aid provides Israel with the needed backing for its "annexationist" policy, its refusal to implement UN Security Council Resolution 242, and its efforts to thwart the Jarring mission.

An editorial in NOVOYE VREMENYA (No. 31, 28 July) accused Arab "rightist and extreme nationalist elements" of assisting imperialist and Zionist quarters in their "frontal attack" on Soviet-Arab friendship. The editorial claimed that "reactionary bourgeois propaganda" was misinterpreting the Soviet military withdrawal from Egypt in an effort to portray it as a symptom of "cooling" of Soviet-Egyptian relations. NOVOYE VREMENYA complained of efforts to convince the Arabs that their national problems could be solved with the aid of some Western good offices. It also objected to the airing of the "slanderous idea" that the USSR had not the slightest interest in a Middle East settlement but rather benefited from the no peace, no war situation there.

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Along the same lines, in a foreign-language radio commentary on 4 August, Soviet commentator Shragin charged that "certain organs of bourgeois propaganda" viewed the return of Soviet military personnel as evidence of "discord" between the USSR and Egypt and sought to capitalize on this "slander" to separate the Arabs from their communist friends. At the same time, he claimed, this propaganda maintained that the key to a solution of the Middle East problem lay in Washington. Making the same point in the domestic service commentators' roundtable program on the 6th, Shragin added that the New York TIMES even contended that "allegedly during the Soviet-American summit talks" it was agreed, "tacitly or openly, not to change the status quo in the Middle East for the time being." Quoting the Moscow summit communique, Shragin wondered where there was any agreement on maintaining the status quo.

Reflecting sensitivity to the charge of "superpower" behavior, a Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the 8th claimed that the spreading of this concept is designed to mask the differences of principle between Soviet and American policies and "their completely contradictory objectives." It cited the return of the Soviet military advisers as demonstrating Moscow's respect for national sovereignty and noninterference in the Arabs' internal affairs. And it warned that forces hostile to the Arabs were exploiting the superpower "misconception" to "disarm the Arabs" and weaken their anti-imperialist positions. In the same vein, Vishnevskiy's international review in PRAVDA on the 6th claimed that "imperialist" propaganda was suggesting to "certain Arab states" that if they isolated themselves from the "forces of peace and progress" they might hope for some favors from the West. Vishnevskiy said it was clear, from reports of the Senate vote to continue credit deliveries of weapons to Tel Aviv, where the "favors" were actually going; he pointed out that Israeli Foreign Minister Eban had publicly expressed hope for "a 'weakening of the military potential' of the Arab countries."

Cataloguing instances of Soviet support for the Arabs, a Ukrantsev commentary broadcast in Arabic on the 7th reminded listeners of Soviet military supplies and training assistance, including the provision "for a few years" of a "certain number" of Soviet military personnel to Egypt at Cairo's request. While he recalled Soviet and American support at the Moscow summit for cooperation with Jarring and noted the two parties' avowed readiness to play their parts in bringing about a peaceful

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solution in the Middle East, Ukraintsev juxtaposed to this reminder a reiteration of Soviet support for the Arabs' "right to employ every means at their disposal" to liberate the occupied territories should Israel continue to refuse a political settlement based on Resolution 242.

A Shakhov foreign-language commentary on the 4th took issue with "Western" allegations that the Soviet Union aimed at insuring its hegemony in the Mediterranean and that the USSR's position was preventing a peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem. Rejecting this "perfidious and vicious lie," Shakhov declared that the Soviet Union is sincerely concerned with establishing peace in all regions; "naturally, it cannot be indifferent to the situation" in the Mediterranean, and no one can deny that events there "directly concern its vital and fundamental interests." Shakhov went on to insist that such Soviet interests coincided with the goals of other peace-loving countries of the region.

PODGORNYY HAS "WARM, FRIENDLY TALK" WITH VISITING EGYPTIANS

Continuing to build up an image of ongoing friendly relations with Egypt, Moscow has publicized the first "official friendly" visit of an Egyptian delegation to the USSR since Prime Minister Sidqi's mid-July talks in Moscow, prior to as-Sadat's announcement on the Soviet military withdrawal from Egypt.* The parliamentary delegation, led by People's Assembly speaker Hafiz Badawi, left Moscow for home on the 5th with a stopover in the Crimea, where the delegation was received by Podgornyy. TASS' short 5 August account of the meeting said the "warm, friendly talk" covered questions of further development of Soviet-Egyptian relations, parliamentary ties, and "pressing international problems," specifically the Middle East situation. Podgornyy, TASS said, expressed firm confidence that the friendly Egyptian-Soviet relations would continue to develop. Badawi was reported as expressing Egypt's desire to further strengthen ties in all spheres and as registering gratitude for the USSR's "constant and disinterested assistance."

* A delegation representing "the CPSU leadership" is to arrive in Cairo at the end of August, according to AL-AHRAM on 6 August, for political and organizational talks with the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) leadership within the framework of the CPSU-ASU cooperation protocol.

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Badawi's own account of the meeting with Podgornyy upon his arrival home, as reported in Cairo media, described the atmosphere as one of "friendship and total frankness."

Podgornyy told the Egyptians of "his eagerness" to develop and strengthen Soviet-Egyptian relations, according to Badawi, and stressed that this friendship "cannot be affected" by disruptive imperialist and Zionist propaganda. Badawi said Podgornyy also expressed "full satisfaction" with the proclamation of unity between Egypt and Libya.* The MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) reported that Podgornyy cut short his vacation to receive the delegation; Cairo's AKHBAR AL-YAWM, as reported by the IRAQI NEWS AGENCY on the 5th, said Podgornyy had asked for the meeting.

A Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the 9th cited the Cairo weekly AKHIR SA'AH for an assessment of the "successful" visit as an expression of the "ever-strengthening" Soviet-Egyptian relations. AKHIR SA'AH, Moscow said, pointed to "a number of tangible results" of the talks, particularly with regard to "the adoption of a common stand toward various questions" of the anti-imperialist struggle and the Middle East situation. Moscow also reported Badawi as saying, according to the weekly, that those who try to cast doubt on Soviet-Egyptian friendship or to "sabotage the existing relations" are making a great mistake.

BREZHNEV LETTER Following the return home of the parliamentary delegation, Cairo's AL-AHRAM on the 7th reported that as-Sadat had received an "important letter" from Brezhnev. Moscow has maintained its customary silence on such communications. The letter, AL-AHRAM said, dealt with the "latest developments in Arab-Soviet relations" and would be the subject of "broad contacts" that would pave the way for "political contacts at summit level." On the same day, however, Egyptian Minister of State for Information az-Zayyat said at a press

* Other than a short report in TASS' international service in Russian on 2 August, noting the announcement of plans to prepare for Libyan-Egyptian unification by 1 September 1973, Moscow has ignored as-Sadat's and al-Qadhafi's 2 August Benghazi declaration. Budapest radio took a dim view of the proposed merger in a commentary on the 3d which said the announcement reflected changes since Nasir's death. The gains of the "Nasirite right" since last spring, the radio said, have led to a strengthening of "the religious characteristics of national policy and political practice" as well as to "a sharpening of anticomunism."

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conference that the letter was the subject of attention "but I cannot say that our study so far has revealed to us new roads or that it requests us to carry out any action at present." The minister added that the Egyptian ambassador in Moscow had been called home for consultations, and Cairo radio's 9 August press review cited a headline to the effect that the ambassador would stay in Cairo for a week. AL-AHRAM had noted on the 7th that Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov, after "several contacts" in Cairo, had left for the Crimea where the three top Soviet leaders were vacationing.

MILITARY WITHDRAWAL Giving the impression that the withdrawal of Soviet military personnel from Egypt was winding down, Cairo and Moscow media both reported a 2 August farewell reception hosted by Egyptian War Minister Sadiq to honor senior Soviet military advisers and experts. TASS' account noted that Sadiq and chief military adviser Col. Gen. Okunev "exchanged speeches," but gave no indication of the substance. MENA reported Sadiq's speech, in which he declared that the Soviet departure did not affect Soviet-Egyptian friendship and cooperation, and noted that "the chief Soviet expert spoke" next. In a speech at another farewell function on the 3d, according to TASS, Okunev remarked on the "precise and efficient work" of the "entire apparatus of Soviet military advisers" who were in Egypt at the latter's request. The various farewell ceremonies were again summed up on the 4th in a Moscow broadcast in Arabic and in a dispatch from Cairo by Igor Belyayev, described by TASS as "PRAVDA's correspondent." Belyayev additionally referred to preparations for the departure of personnel assisting the Egyptian air force.

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U S S R - P R C

MOSCOW STEPS UP POLEMICS ON CHINESE LEADERS' POLICIES

An article in the 7 August IZVESTIYA expands the dimensions of Moscow's current round of anti-China attacks, seizing on the publication of a new Chinese world atlas in an effort to show that Moscow continues to be the aggrieved party in the Sino-Soviet border dispute while Peking persists in making intransigent claims to Soviet territory. Taken together with another new polemical broadside, in the 2 August issue of the weekly NOVOYE VREMENYA, the IZVESTIYA article emerges as part of an intensified Soviet effort to discredit the Chinese leadership and to dissuade other countries from receptivity to Peking's diplomacy. Indicting the Peking leaders on the same issue of their attitude toward arms control that had preoccupied "I. Aleksandrov" in the authoritative PRAVDA article of 16 July, pegged to the accounts by Congressmen Boggs and Ford of their talks with the PRC leaders,* the NOVOYE VREMENYA article accused the Chinese of pursuing splitting tactics designed to prevent solutions of "urgent problems" while the PRC builds up its own military strength.

Moscow had curtailed its anti-China polemics in the central press in the wake of Brezhnev's 20 March restatement of Soviet interest in improving relations with the PRC and the return of Deputy Foreign Minister Illichev to the Peking border talks. In his March trade union congress speech Brezhnev had clearly sought to place the onus on the Chinese for any continuing deadlock in the talks. The resumption of polemics on the sensitive border dispute by IZVESTIYA--normally a model of restraint among the central newspapers--suggests that the Peking talks remain unproductive.

IZVESTIYA ARTICLE Entitled "Maoist Geography," the IZVESTIYA article by Georgiy Apalin--available at this writing in TASS and Radio Moscow accounts--charged that the compilers of the new Chinese atlas "falsified the history of relations between Russia and China, and in this way the Chinese leaders are trying to provide a basis for their territorial claims to 1.5 million square kilometers of age-old Soviet territory." Rejecting the Chinese geographers' "discourse about

* See the TRENDS of 19 July 1972, page 30.

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"unequal border treaties" between Russia and China, Apalin reaffirmed the validity of the 19th century border treaties in unequivocal terms: "Not a single document of the Soviet state nor a single statement by Lenin places the treaties on the Chinese frontiers in the category of unequal treaties requiring revision." Thus, he went on, "there can be no question of their invalidation or revision." Judging by the TASS and Radio Moscow accounts, Apalin made no mention of the Soviet offer--uniquely disclosed in a PRAVDA article by I. Aleksandrov in July 1971--to settle the disputed border question "through the conclusion of a new border treaty."

In attempting to explain why the Chinese were "claiming territory that belongs to the USSR," Apalin maintained that the atlas was intended to instill in the Chinese people a hatred of their neighbors as well as to "artificially" create territorial disputes which would harm Soviet-Chinese relations for years to come.

In passages calculated to discredit Peking in the eyes of its Asian neighbors and in the communist countries generally, Apalin argued that the Chinese atlas treated some Asian states with "disdain." Thus he charged that the authors of the atlas could not reconcile themselves to the official name of Malaysia because the PRC does not recognize that state. He likewise claimed that the material on Singapore is arranged in the atlas in such a way as to obscure its status as an independent country. Turning to the socialist sphere, he noted caustically that the atlas ignores Cuba and CEMA, suggesting that the latter omission reflected Peking's "delicate" support for economic integration in Western Europe as a counter to the influence of the United States and the Soviet Union.

NOVOYE VREM'YA ARTICLE

The article in the 2 August issue of

NOVOYE VREM'YA, by Irina Trofimova, seized on Chou En-lai's comments at a banquet for a Yemeni delegation to level a wide-ranging attack at Peking's policies. Quoting Chou to the effect that the two superpowers, despite the new arms control agreements, are continuing to carry out nuclear blackmail and nuclear threats against the peoples of various countries, Trofimova declared:

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This only confirms that the Maoists use the "superpowers" concept, which they borrowed from the ideologists of imperialism, only in one direction--in order to undermine the influence of the socialist community, split the anti-imperialist front, and maintain a strained political atmosphere in the world.

In effect warning the "small and medium countries" against Chou's call for a rallying against the superpowers, Trofimova explained that the Maoists plan was designed to preserve the status quo and to "prevent the positive solution of urgent problems" while the Chinese leaders build up their own strength.

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SOVIET BLOC RELATIONS

CPSU POLITBURO ENDORSES RESULTS OF CRIMEA MEETING

The Soviet Politburo was reported, in a CPSU Central Committee communique published on 6 August, to have discussed the results of the 31 July meeting of bloc leaders in the Crimea and to have expressed its "full approval" of the activities of the Soviet delegation headed by Brezhnev. The Central Committee document was presumably intended to fill the void created by the absence of an announcement on the substance of the Crimea conferees' deliberations--in contrast to the procedure followed at last year's Crimea meeting. Last year's meeting, from which Romania's Ceausescu had been absent, produced a coordinated document in which the participants spelled out unified foreign policy positions, and there had been no ensuing public endorsement by the Soviet Politburo.*

The CPSU Central Committee communique had been preceded by a similar East German one, released by ADN on the 3d, in which the SED Politburo not only gave a vote of confidence to the "principled" and "flexible" foreign policy of the Soviet Union but went out of its way to praise Brezhnev "personally" for implementing the Soviet "peace program." A 7 August PRAVDA editorial also went beyond the language of the Soviet Politburo's endorsement in calling the Crimea meeting "another big step in cementing the unity and coordinating the actions of the fraternal parties of the socialist countries"--a possible allusion to the presence of Ceausescu at this year's meeting.

CPSU COMMUNIQUE Although the communique on the Soviet Politburo's deliberations covered much the same ground as the document released after last year's Crimea conference, it devoted greater attention to Europe and much less to Vietnam and the Middle East. Where the 1971 document had stressed the need for communist unity coupled with a call for struggle against deviations of the left and right, the CPSU communique now spoke only about the growing cohesion within the

* The last time the Soviet Politburo undertook such action was on 12 December 1969, when it publicly approved the activities of the Soviet delegation at a two-day meeting of bloc party and government leaders in Moscow.

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"socialist commonwealth." At the same time, it again endorsed the "peace program" advanced by the 24th CPSU Congress in virtually the same terms as in last year's document.

Where the 1971 document had spoken about the possibility and desirability of reducing armaments and armed forces in Europe, the CPSU communique was notably silent. Instead, it focused on the steps already taken toward detente in Europe--the Soviet and Polish treaties with the FRG, the four-power agreement on Berlin, the GDR's agreements with the FRG and the West Berlin Senat, and the development of "mutually beneficial" relations with France and other countries of Western Europe. Looking ahead, it called for the early admission of the GDR and FRG to the United Nations and reiterated the standard Soviet positions on the convocation of a European security conference and invalidation of the Munich Pact.

On Vietnam and the Middle East, the CPSU communique was notable for its brevity, compressing in one sentence a routine declaration of continuing Soviet bloc support to the "heroic Vietnamese people" with a ritualistic display of indignation over continued Israeli occupation of Arab lands. Although the Politburo was reported to have reached a decision "defining practical measures for implementation of the conclusions of the Crimea meeting," the nature of that decision was not specified in the communique.

PRAVDA EDITORIAL In its lengthy editorial on 7 August, PRAVDA amplified the themes enunciated in the Politburo endorsement. The Crimea meeting, the editorial observed, discussed "key world problems" and "focused special attention on the situation in Europe," an area where PRAVDA maintained the trend toward detente had become irreversible despite the persistent efforts of "reactionary" elements to create roadblocks in the way of "extensive peaceful European cooperation." "Step by step," PRAVDA insisted, "peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems and good neighborly relations between them are become part and parcel of international relations."

PRAVDA also had high praise for the Moscow summit talks, a topic not broached in the Politburo communique. "The party and government of this country," PRAVDA explained, "have world peace in mind in developing relations with the United States." It went on to point out that the outcome of the Moscow summit talks and the stand taken by the Soviet Union had received wide support among communist parties and governments and "all peace-loving nations."

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While noting the favorable results of the Soviet "peace offensive," the PRAVDA editorial at the same time sounded a note of caution. "The expectations of our party and people are sober ones," it declared. "They assess the present situation realistically and harbor no illusions about the antidemocratic essence of imperialism and its aggressive strivings." In keeping with this theme, PRAVDA reiterated the stock slogans on the continuation of ideological struggle between social systems and the impermissibility of peaceful coexistence in the realm of ideas.

The PRAVDA editorial also went beyond the language of the Politburo endorsement in condemning the "criminal actions of the American military" in Vietnam. It likewise characterized the situation in the Middle East as "complicated" and "dangerous" and denounced "imperialist circles" for supporting "aggressive quarters of Israel."

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CZECHOSLOVAK TRIALS

PRAGUE SHOWS GROWING SENSITIVITY TO FOREIGN CRITICISM

Avoiding direct acknowledgment of the public protests by the French, Italian, and British communist parties against the trials in progress in Prague and Brno, Czechoslovak media have intensified their rebuttals of "Western bourgeois" criticisms of the trials as political persecution of Dubcek-era reformers. The intensity of the Czechoslovak response seems traceable in part to the continued public airing of critical comment by the large, influential Italian Communist Party, which has sought to dissociate itself from the Czechoslovak Government's actions for domestic political reasons. Western "bourgeois" arguments Prague has decried include arguments advanced by the Italian and French CP's; and there have been echoes in Prague comment of the oblique rebuke delivered to the West European CP's by the Czechoslovak party's number-two figure, Bilak, on 28 July when he remarked pointedly that those parties should channel their concern into areas like Vietnam and Ireland.*

Emerging as a further step toward the possible ultimate goal of bringing leading party and government figures of the Dubcek era to the dock, the current trials involve chiefly intellectuals and middle-level party functionaries. The most prominent are Jaromir Litera, a former secretary of the Prague city party committee who was elected to the CPCZ Central Committee by the "extraordinary" 14th party congress of 22 August 1968; Milan Huebl, a former director of the Higher Party School; and Jiri Mueller, former president of the Czechoslovak Students Union.

Czechoslovak press and radio comment belabors the claim that the defendants are being tried for "crimes" committed during the period from 1970 to early 1972, not during 1968-69, and that the trials are thus not directed against the followers of Alexander Dubcek. A commentary carried by the Prague international service on the 6th, noting "Western bourgeois propaganda" regarding trials held in Czechoslovak courts "in the past two weeks," conceded on the one hand that the trials involved people who "were among the leading

* For background on the West European CP criticisms and a discussion of Bilak's remarks, see the TRENDS of 2 August 1972, pages 34-39.

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representatives of rightwing opportunism and counterrevolution during the 1968-69 period," but insisted in the same breath that their "criminal offense of subverting the republic" was committed "during the period 1970-72--we repeat, 1970-72." The commentary went on to deny allegations that "political trials" were being held. It also noted statements by unidentified sources to the effect that "the highest Czechoslovak political and state official" had promised that there would be no political trials--an allusion to the French Communist Party's recollection of such a promise by Husak. The broadcast rejoined defensively: "To this it must be said immediately that there have been and will be no political trials" in the CSSR, "as no one in our country has been or will be put on trial for his views and attitudes."

The door had been opened for the current and future political trials in Husak's public proviso that while there would be no political trials, "naturally" those violating "socialist legality" must be brought to book. An article in the 18 July RUDE PRAVO, stipulating that printing and distributing "antistate" leaflets and forming antistate groups constitute "illegal" activities, did not directly refer to the initial trials in the current series which had been reported by CTK the previous day. But an article in RUDE PRAVO on 2 August, entitled "Laws Must Be Observed by Everybody," explicitly scored what it called Western bourgeois propaganda on the Czechoslovak trials of persons who had violated "our penal code." The article took its cue from Bilak's remark of the 28th in denouncing such propaganda for "overwhelming the readers by inventions about trials in Czechoslovakia, describing them as political rather than admitting appalling facts about the daily killing of innocent people of the DRW. . . , about the massacres which are an everyday event in Ulster."

Prague's sensitivity to the criticism of the trials produced rare direct references to Dubcek in commentaries on the 4th: An article in the Bratislava PRAVDA cited Western "outrageous lies" to the effect that "supporters of A. Dubcek are being prosecuted for their political activities and convictions in 1968-69 on the basis of trumped-up charges." And a station editorial broadcast by the Prague radio in English insisted that none of those sentenced so far were tried for "their support for Alexander Dubcek," but only "for concrete criminal acts committed in 1970 and 1971."

MOSCOW COVERAGE Soviet media have continued to carry brief reports on the trials. TASS on the 3d said that "J. Sabata and his accomplices," whose trial started that day in the Brno regional court, "are being accused of creating

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in the period from 1970 to the end of January 1972 an underground antistate group with the aim of overthrowing the socialist state and social system." PRAVDA on 1 August reported the opening of the trial of "Assistant Professor M. Huebl and others" in the Prague city court the previous day, and the Moscow domestic service on the 2d said Huebl had been sentenced to six and a half years' imprisonment "for his destructive activities" against the socialist state system in the CSSR. It added that Huebl "and his accomplices were accused of preparing and distributing at home and abroad illegal printed material containing slanderous fabrications about the situation in Czechoslovakia and other socialist countries." The Brno court's sentencing of Jaroslav Sabata to six and a half years' imprisonment on the 8th on similar charges was briefly reported by TASS the next day.

ITALIAN CP PURSUES CRITICISM IN DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTEXT

The Italian Communist Party (PCI) has sustained its public expressions of disapproval of the Czechoslovak trials, motivated by evident concern that its own domestic political image may be tarnished by association in the minds of the Italian electorate. The PCI's chief concern has come through clearly in complaints that its political opponents are trying to blacken its image on grounds that it has muted its criticism of the trials under the guise of loyalty to the principle of noninterference in another communist party's affairs.

Responding to such charges, which in effect accuse the PCI of putting its relations with the Czechoslovak communists first, an unsigned article in the 1 August issue of the party daily L'UNITA explained that the PCI had stressed its adherence to the principle of noninterference in other parties' affairs "precisely in order to declare that we do not consider the trials in Prague as domestic affairs of Czechoslovakia alone, and thus to justify our reasoned critical opinion and our regret" over the trials.

Alluding to the French Communist Party (PCF) statement of 28 July censuring the trials, the L'UNITA article insisted that the PCI's position was arrived at independently and was not influenced by the views of other communist parties or motivated by a desire to flaunt "the weight carried by the PCF and the PCI." But the article went on to buttress the PCI's position by citing information the PCF said it had obtained directly from the Czechoslovak party. Noting that the PCF's "severe criticism" of the trials followed an "assurance" given by the Czechoslovaks to the effect

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that no one would be tried for his personal opinions," L'UNITA went on to reaffirm the PCI stand that the "only" way to pursue the "struggle" is through "an open political and ideological battle," using the process to counter any "erroneous political positions" that may arise.

One charge leveled at the PCI was that it was hedging its criticism on the pretext that there was insufficient information about the details of the Czechoslovak proceedings; a 22 July L'UNITA article had provided grist for this charge in observing that "little is known" about the trials. On 4 August, directly replying to allegations that the party was "hiding behind the absence of official information," L'UNITA said--with emphatic redundancy--that the party had been "the first to adopt a position of clear disapproval and firm disapprobation" after the sentencing of former CPCZ Higher Party School director Heubl on 1 August. The PCI organ went on to assail the Czechoslovaks for giving insufficient publicity to the trials and to take issue with the "merits" of the charges against the defendants. Citing RUDE PRAVO's argument that the charges against the accused were fully within the prerogatives of a socialist society to bring in defense of the socialist system and were fully in accord with "socialist legality," L'UNITA said RUDE PRAVO had in effect "confirmed our own assessment and that of the PCF" regarding the "illegality" of the charges. The article went on to assert that "it is precisely the laws themselves that must be questioned at all times in order to justify their validity."

Prague radio notably displayed sensitivity to the Italian party's polemics in the "editorial" broadcast in the international service on 4 August. The broadcast recalled criticism aired in the West in January when the Italian journalist Ochetto was arrested in Prague for smuggling materials in and out of Czechoslovakia for emigres--actions to which he admitted publicly. While noting that there had been a "hullabaloo" over the arrest in the "bourgeois" mass media, the Prague broadcast neglected to mention that L'UNITA had also expressed concern that the arrest of Ochetto, and of another Italian newsman who belonged to the PCI, might be a "prelude to an abandonment" of the promise not to hold political trials. The radio editorial asserted that now "the truth cannot again be silenced."

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SPANISH CP-CPSU

PCE RADIO PUBLICIZES CPSU SUPPORT FOR CARRILLO LEADERSHIP

Moscow has called for "closer bonds" between the CPSU and the independent-minded Spanish Communist Party (PCE), according to a 2 August interview carried by the PCE's clandestine Radio Independent Spain (REI) with one of the Spanish CP Central Committee members who visited the Soviet Union at the end of June and beginning of July.

If the REI interview accurately reflects the outcome of the CPSU-PCE talks, the development squares with indications of a general effort on Moscow's part to mend fences with maverick communist forces in Europe--alienated by the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia--in the interests of a show of maximum interparty unity in anticipation of the projected conference on European security and cooperation. Its propaganda on Yugoslavia's community of interests with the other "socialist" states in the wake of Tito's June visit to the USSR, its stress on good Soviet-Romanian relations before and after the 31 July Crimea summit meeting of Soviet bloc leaders, and its comment emphasizing unity among the European CP's in connection with the 27 July meeting of those parties on Vietnam* form a part of this pattern.

Against the background of a protracted chill in CPSU-PCE relations during which the Soviets were evidently backing a dissident, staunchly pro-Soviet faction, Moscow is still treading cautiously and has yet to report any details of the fence-mending CPSU talks with PCE Central Committee members. There has been no followup of any kind in Soviet media to a five-line PRAVDA report on 5 July which acknowledged the presence of a group of PCE "journalists"

* According to the main report to the Paris Conference of European Communist and Workers Parties on Vietnam by French CP leader Georges Marchais, carried in the party organ L'HUMANITE on the 28th, 28 European parties responded "favorably" to the French invitation to the gathering and 27--including the PCE--sent delegations. The Irish CP did not send a representative because of the difficulties in Ulster, but did send a telegram praising the French party's initiative. The representative of the independent-minded Communist Party of the Netherlands, which has recently engaged in open polemics with the CPSU, was listed as an "observer."

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in the USSR.* But PCE Central Committee member Jesus Izcaray, in the 2 August REI interview, spoke effusively of the support manifested by the Soviet "comrades" and "leaders" for the PCE during the talks.

In the first detailed REI appraisal of the results of the talks since the delegation left the USSR, apparently during the first week of July, Izcaray implied that the group had made the trip in response to a Soviet initiative: The delegation, Izcaray said, had been "invited by the CPSU" for an information-gathering and study tour of the USSR, and their reception had been "very cordial, very fraternal." He reported that the Soviet "comrades" had "expressed their wishes for friendship between the two parties, for friendship, for closer bonds, for fraternal bonds which have always existed between the CPSU and PCE, the party of Dolores Ibarruri and Santiago Carrillo--your party, as they said." He went on to say that the "bonds" which have developed through common struggles "have become closer," adding with considerable satisfaction that "in this respect we congratulate ourselves on the visit."

Later in the interview, Izcaray judged that "in many respects" the talks had a "positive balance . . . because the trip has been a further expression of the bonds which united the two parties and which are indestructible." The Soviet "comrades," he said, had reaffirmed that "the PCE, the party of Dolores, the party of Santiago, . . . is at present the principal force--not the only one but the principal force--of Spain's revolutionary present and of its democratic and socialist future."

* See the TRENDS of 26 July 1972, pages 29-30, for a discussion of the PRAVDA report and REI's earlier publicity for the delegation's visit. The first sentence in paragraph two of that article, page 29, should be corrected to read: The PRAVDA report, the only one on the visit in monitored Soviet media, carried no additional information on the delegation's visit.

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CHINA

RED FLAG ARTICLE EXPLAINS APPEARANCE OF "SWINDLERS"

An article in RED FLAG No. 8, reprinted in PEOPLE'S DAILY and broadcast by Peking on 8 August, seems to inch closer to a formal public denunciation of Lin Piao and his followers, all still unnamed. For the first time in open media, the article states that Mao, "with the great magnanimity of a proletarian revolutionary," tried many times to save "the swindlers like Liu Shao-chi" since their exposure, but to no avail. In vague but ominous language, the article notes that these "swindlers" continued to carry out the criminal activities and "finally have brought about their own destruction."

The article develops the thesis that the rise of disloyal leaders is an inevitable part of the dialectical process, but that through adherence to Mao's line all such inimical elements can be eliminated one after the other before they seize party power--a doctrine of inevitability that serves to offset the notion that Mao himself may have been less than prescient in detecting traitors in good time.

The first reason the article adduces for the inevitable appearance of traitors is that "imperialism and social-imperialism look for agents within our party." Denigrating the members of Lin's group as Soviet pawns disloyal to China, the article goes on to say that "the antiparty conspiracies and activities of swindlers like Liu Shao-chi are by no means isolated and accidental, but have their international background."

RED FLAG casts the continual, inevitable struggle with hidden enemies in a positive light, as a process that ebbs and flows and flushes out the enemies during periods of major eruption. Reviewing the two decades of communist rule in China, it observes that "every few years a major struggle inevitably occurs," citing the Kao Kang, Peng Te-huai, and Liu Shao-chi attempts to usurp power as cases in point; the struggle intensifies and wanes as the revolution "moves through one specific stage after another," an instance of intensification being the cultural revolution period when "ghosts and monsters emerged from their lairs one after another," only to be ferreted out while at the same time "the masses were tempered." In the course of this exposition the article

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makes what amounts to the first open Chinese claim that Lin's fall was a consequence of the cultural revolution, stating that during that period "swindlers like Liu Shao-chi, who at first appeared respectable," had their camouflage stripped off when "they stepped forward to carry out their conspiracy to usurp party power."

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CHINA-SRI LANKA

PEKING GIVES SPARSE ATTENTION TO SRI LANKA CP LEADER'S VISIT

Consistent with Peking's general policy of playing down its association with splinter communist parties and other dissident groups that might complicate its broadening diplomatic efforts, Peking gave only the briefest of coverage to the visit of Sri Lanka (Ceylon) CP Secretary General Sanmugathasan to China in July. In the first mention of the pro-Chinese party to appear in PRC media since the abortive insurrection in Sri Lanka in April 1971, an NCNA dispatch on 10 July reported Sanmugathasan's arrival that day for a visit at the invitation of the CCP Central Committee. The brief report, Peking's only coverage of the visit, said he was met on arrival by Keng Piao and other officials of the CCP's International Liaison Department but provided no other details.

A long-standing vocal opponent of the Sri Lanka Government who was interned until last February under emergency regulations stemming from the 1971 insurrection, Sammugathasan came to China as part of a three-month tour--ending 31 July--to drum up international support for an end to the emergency regulations. He arrived in Peking only five days after the highly publicized two-week visit to China of a top-level Sri Lanka Government delegation led by Prime Minister Bandaranaike. Peking had highlighted that visit as a major milestone in the development of friendly relations between the two states and must have viewed Sanmugathasan's arrival so soon afterward with a degree of disquiet.

Samugathasan's party has long been a loyal supporter of radical Maoist policies and of Peking's side in the Sino-Soviet polemics, for which the Chinese in turn gave the party ample publicity, but Peking withdrew its propaganda support following the outbreak of the April 1971 insurrection. At that time Peking was concerned that its close association with this radical party, which was then under suspicion by Colombo authorities in connection with the rebellion, might cause the Bandaranaike government to connect China with the insurrection and reverse the warming trend in relations between the two states. The Chinese were put on the defensive particularly by charges from Soviet bloc media and from spokesmen of the pro-Soviet Sri Lanka CP that "Maoist elements" had been instrumental in directing the rebel movement. In response to this situation, Peking avoided all comment on the insurrection, dropped coverage of the pro-Chinese CP, and quickly

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offered the Bandaranaike government a long-term, interest-free loan in convertible foreign exchange. The loan offer was accompanied by a letter from Chou En-lai to the prime minister, unpublicized by Peking but later released in Sri Lanka media, which forcefully denounced the insurrection, pointedly citing Mao Tse-tung's authority to condemn such "ultraleft" opportunists and to attack the "handful of persons who style themselves as 'Guevarists.'"

Peking's failure to publicize more than a brief report on Sanmugathasan's visit suggests a desire to keep intiregime elements in Sri Lanka at arms length while actively pursuing improved state ties with Colombo. Sanmugathasan implied as much in comments to the press upon arrival back in Colombo on 31 July. Though he said he had sought Chinese assistance in gaining the release of Sri Lanka communists still detained as a result of the emergency regulations, he offered no evidence that the Chinese were willing to help. Indeed, he indicated that Peking was even unwilling to support his radical wing of the party against efforts to oust him from the top post by a more moderate faction that favors an end to the party's opposition to the Bandaranaike government. The Chinese, he said, judged that "it was a matter for the local party."

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